





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bowling, B., & Westenra, S. (2018). A really hostile environment: adiaphorization, global policing and the
crimmigration control system. THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1362480618774034
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.








A Dickson Poon Transnational Law Institute, King’s College London 
Research Paper Series 
 
 
‘A really hostile environment’:  Adiaphorization, global 
policing and the crimmigration control system 
 
 
Ben Bowling and Sophie Westenra 
 
Forthcoming in the Theoretical Criminology Journal, 2018 
 
TLI Think! Paper 8/2018 
 











The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London 
W: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/tli E: tli@kcl.ac.uk 
 




Abstract: This article examines institutional practices designed to control criminalized 
migrants in the UK and advances three arguments. First, these practices have evolved, 
since the early 1970s, into a bespoke ‘crimmigration control system’ distinct from the 
domestic criminal justice system. Second, this system is directed exclusively at efficient 
exclusion and control; through a process of adiaphorization, moral objections to the 
creation of a ‘really hostile environment’ have been disabled. Third, the pursuit of the 
criminalized immigrant—a globally recognized ‘folk devil’—provides a vital link between 
domestic and global systems of policing, punishment and exclusion. The UK 
crimmigration control system is an example of wider processes that are taking place in 
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It is well established that in recent years new methods of social control have emerged 
that are specifically targeted at the detection, capture, punishment, detention and 
banishment of criminalized migrants (Aas and Bosworth, 2012; Bosworth et al. 2017). A 
new literature has documented and theorized the emergence of new legal tools at the 
confluence of criminal and immigration law and the evolving surveillant, investigative, 
punitive and exclusionary practices it has authorized (Stumpf 2006; Bosworth et al., 
2018). These practices can be observed in a range of institutional sites familiar to 
criminologists, including police, courts, and prisons, as well as in less familiar ones, such 
as ports and airports, secret intelligence agencies, the military and private security firms. 
They also reach deep into areas of social policy including housing, employment, road 
traffic and marriage. While many authors in this field note the general apparatus of 
control before delving into a specific area, in this article we examine, in turn, each element 
in the UK context—legal foundations, police, intelligence, courts and prisons—to identify 
some of the themes and issues that characterize the system as an increasingly integrated 
whole. 
 
We seek to advance three arguments. First, we contend that the institutional practices 
geared towards controlling criminalized migrants, which began developing in the United 
Kingdom in the early 1970s, have evolved into a bespoke ‘crimmigration control system’. 
This emerging system has clear connections to, and works in parallel with, the UK 
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domestic criminal justice system but is becoming increasingly distinct from it.  Although 
the crimmigration control system lacks, as yet, the organizational coherence of the 
criminal justice system, it has its own tailored institutions, organized schema, working 
methods and underlying principles. Second, we argue that the crimmigration control 
system focuses on the goals of exclusion, control and efficiency at the expense of justice. 
Through a process of bureaucratization and social distancing—what Bauman (1989) 
calls adiaphorization—moral objections to the creation of a ‘really hostile environment’ 
for illegal migrants are silenced.1  Third, we argue that the crimmigration control system 
is a key link between domestic and global systems of policing, punishment and exclusion 
(Bowling et al., 2012; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). The pursuit of the criminalized 
immigrant—a globally recognized ‘folk devil’—encourages communication, 
collaboration and coordination across a range of surveillant, coercive, punitive and 
carceral institutions in many countries. We submit that it is useful to examine UK 
crimmigration control as an example of wider processes that are taking place 
transnationally in institutions concerned with the control of suspect populations.  
 
 
II. Context: a world in motion 
 
 
Mobility and fluidity are notable features of contemporary global society. Mass border 
crossing is an essential feature of this society, accelerated by neoliberal globalization and 
the global capitalist economy, which require people to be free to move with transnational 
flows of money. Instead of a space of places, we increasingly exist in a space of flows 
(Castells, 1996). But the world’s poor and disadvantaged, particularly those born in the 
global south, experience the space of flows very differently. While the network society 
brings some states together in shared sovereignty, populations that fail to add value to 
the network are excluded (Aas, 2007).  Western states actively immobilize sectors of 
global society they see as less desirable in a flawed and harmful attempt at global social 
mobility control (Weber and Bowling, 2008).  
 
Seeking to control mobility serves to delineate membership of the space of flows; the 
outsider—the undesirable migrant—becomes the natural means to consolidate this 
ideology, becoming not only a target for harsh displays of state power but also a 
scapegoat for those members of the public who feel abandoned, powerless and fearful in 
the neoliberal globalized world (Bromley, 2015: 57). According to this view, anxieties 
brought about by social changes, such as the decline of the welfare state or long-term 
unemployment, are projected onto a manufactured anxiety about undesirable migrants 
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(Bromley, 2015: 47; Weber and Bowling, 2008). As a global ‘folk devil’, the illegal 
immigrant provides a powerful legitimating device for the construction of systems to 
segregate and control the ‘usual suspects’ (Bowling et al., 2012: 47–53; Bowling and 
Sheptycki, 2012: 102–4, 113–17). The attempt to control suspect populations has a long 
history, but what is interesting and important about the present situation is the 
development of locally implemented but transnationally linked systems to police, punish 
and control the ‘global vagabonds’ (Weber and Bowling, 2008). 
 
We have sought elsewhere to explain the role of ‘race’ and racism in shaping immigration 
policing (Bowling and Westenra, 2018), but limited space prevents us from developing 
this line of inquiry in this article (but see Bosworth et al., 2018). It seems clear that the 
pursuit of security commonly relies upon the identification of suspect populations and 
intentionally partial and exclusionary strategies (Zedner, 2003: 167). It is equally clear 
that identifying ‘suspiciousness’ is tied up with visible difference and that people of 
colour tend to be targets for surveillance and control (Bowling and Westenra, 2018). 
Fekete (2001) makes a direct link between the resurgence of xeno-racist politics and 
diminishing governmental capacity to provide security. The resulting rhetoric about the 
‘threat to security’ posed by illegal migration have entwined with the putative goals and 
ideals of the criminal justice system. An emerging ‘new penology’ emphasizes risk-based 
crime control methods or actuarial justice, identifying, classifying and managing groups 
according to their presumed level of dangerousness (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Weber and 
Bowling, 2008). The individual’s humanity and suffering disappears from view in order 
that marginal populations may be managed, contained, or excluded efficiently (Zedner, 
2003: 168). Where such processes have hitherto been nationally circumscribed they are 
now networked transnationally (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). This shift forms the 
backdrop to the emergence of crimmigration law in the UK and the concomitant control 
system, to which we now turn. 
 
 
III. Crimmigration law 
 
 
The epistemological foundations of the emerging arrangements for the control of 
criminalized migrants lie in ‘crimmigration law’, an umbrella term for the interweaving 
of two spheres of law: administrative immigration law and criminal law (Stumpf, 2006, 
2012, 2013). This hybridization began as ‘a trend toward criminalizing violations of 
immigration law and broadly imposing immigration consequences for criminal acts’ 
(Stumpf, 2012: 48–9). Four relatively new legal phenomena merit closer examination in 
the UK context: (1) the creation of specific immigration-crime offences, (2) deportation 





1) Immigration-crime offences 
 
The first step towards this hybridization was the gradual introduction of immigration-
crime offences. Over the past four decades, administrative breaches of UK immigration 
law—such as unlawful entry, arriving without documents, breaching visa conditions or 
overstaying—have been redefined as specific immigration crimes. The UK government 
now proudly asserts that there is a corresponding criminal offence for almost every 
breach of immigration law (Home Office, 2010: 26). Immigration-crime offences were 
introduced to provide enforcement officers with new tools to enforce compliance, 
enhance the role of immigration officers and tackle evidentiary problems (Aliverti, 2013: 
129). The criminalization of immigration violates JS Mill’s harm principle, in which ‘the 
only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Zedner, 2013: 51; citing Mill 
1859/1979: 68; see also Bowling, 2010a). The various categories of immigration-derived 
criminal offences do not protect individuals from harm or the risk of harm (Aliverti, 
2012b: 426); but they do animate and strengthen the crimmigration control system. 
Immigration offences cannot be said to impose a wrongfulness criterion, either, as most 
offences are crimes of strict liability (Zedner, 2013: 51).  
 
Although immigration crimes have a low prosecution rate in the UK, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, and substantive criminalization, disproportionately target the 
most vulnerable. The most common prosecution is for the strict liability offence of 
arriving in the UK without documents or with false documents (Aliverti, 2012a: 103), an 
act that many asylum seekers are compelled to commit in order to reach the UK because 
of pre-embarkation checks and visa requirements. This offence can be utilized to 
imprison asylum seekers, overcoming legal obstacles to administrative detention while 
their claims are assessed (Aliverti, 2013: 70, 87). The prospect of arrest and punishment 
exerts pressure on people to return to the country of their inbound flight’s origin (Vine, 
2014a: 4.59).  
 
The most serious offence of facilitation is, in the majority of cases, used against 
individuals, often family members, who may merely have assisted by booking a flight 
ticket. The protection of vulnerable individuals is absent. The Immigration Act 2016 takes 
this further, creating new imprisonable offences of illegal working and driving a motor 
vehicle while unlawfully in the UK, along with the power to confiscate wages as ‘proceeds 
of crime’ and seize motor vehicles (Home Office, 2015a). The rhetoric of targeting large-
scale organized crime, and the Home Office’s actuarial ‘harm matrix’ policy of identifying 
the most harmful immigration offenders, serve as a smokescreen, creating the impression 






2) Deportation of non-citizens as an adjunct to a criminal sentence 
 
The power to deport following a criminal conviction is a second key feature of 
crimmigration law. Deportation is the process whereby a non-citizen can be compulsorily 
removed from a jurisdiction and prevented from returning unless the deportation order 
is revoked. As a means of tightening social control over immigrants and ‘cleansing’ society 
of its least desirable members, its instrumental success has been secured through the 
introduction of automatic deportation (Kanstroom, 2000: 1891–2). Removing judicial 
discretion and any consideration of individualized mitigating factors, the UK Borders Act 
2007 prescribes automatic deportation for all non-European Economic Area (EEA) 
offenders sentenced to 12 months’ custody or more and EEA offenders sentenced to 24 
months’ custody or more. Unsurprisingly, the number of foreign national offenders 
deported each year doubled within two years of the Act’s introduction. 
 
Deportation parallels the use of imprisonment for criminal citizens but is a more far-
reaching method of social exclusion and incapacitation. Sending a person away from a 
country or place for the official purpose of punishment constitutes the age-old practice of 
banishment (Becket and Herbert, 2010). Nonetheless, in law, the sanction is classified as 
an administrative decision rather than a punishment, a categorization that has been 
supported by the courts. In AT (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2010], the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that deportation amounted to a penalty 
and held that it was a measure taken in pursuance of the law of aliens, not the criminal 
law; it was preventive rather than punitive. As Zedner (2015: 5) reasons, however, the 
prevailing justifications for punishment today are hybrid, i.e. embrace different purposes 
simultaneously, which ‘means that the borders between penal and non-penal measures 
cannot be set by reference to purpose alone; so the claim that a measure is primarily 
preventive does not necessarily take it outside the realm of punishment’ (our emphasis). 
Indeed, even if deportation is primarily preventive, it serves ‘an incapacitating function 
to the deported and a deterrent function to others’, and may ‘also, of course, be 
understood as a form of retribution’ (Kanstroom, 2000: 1893, our emphasis). 
 
Post-conviction deportation is, therefore, underpinned by traditionally accepted 
justifications for criminal punishment rather than administrative decision-making. 
Moreover, plenty of evidence suggests that deportation is experienced as punishment, 
especially when community, work and family ties are broken (MacDonald and Toal, 2010: 
1280). But because deportation is classified as an administrative decision, it is shielded 
from the scrutiny that is applied when punishments are imposed through the due process 
of criminal law. The principles of proportionality and that no one should be punished 
twice for the same offence do not come into play. This disingenuous categorization also 
allows for a direct departure from the evaluative approach to sentencing in the criminal 




Sentencing is a sophisticated exercise, balancing factors such as the nature of the crime, 
the impact on victims, and the risk that the accused person poses to the public. Not only 
does automatic deportation remove all discretion from the judges, it is the nationality and 
citizenship (or lack thereof) of the individual in the dock that determines the sentence. 
The process is a technical and bureaucratic one that creates a distance between the 
decision-maker and the person whose life is affected by the decision. The result is a loss 
of sensitivity on the part of the decision-maker and a neutralization of their moral 
responsibility for the care of others (Baumann, 1989: 184; Barker, 2010: 279). The 
process of deportation is also an inherently transnational one, since it requires the 
physical removal of the deportee by domestic authorities to a foreign jurisdiction usually 
under the supervision of the sending country or a private contractor working under their 
authority. 
 
3) Accessorial liability using administrative and criminal sanctions 
 
A third element of UK crimmigration law criminalizes people who provide help to 
migrants who themselves have been criminalized. In addition to criminal sanctions for 
facilitation, there are civil penalty regimes for employers, carriers and private landlords 
who offer jobs, flights or housing to an undocumented migrant or over-stayer. This area 
of law is expanding as a result of the UK Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, which 
widened the scope of its subjects. Employers of undocumented migrants, for example, are 
subject to a civil penalty of up to £10,000 per employee under the Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Act 2006. This exists in tandem with the narrower criminal offence of 
employing knowingly, or with reasonable cause to believe, an individual who lacks 
permission to work. This offence requires a significant degree of culpability, in contrast 
to the strict liability offence of failure to produce documents, and the civil penalty scheme 
is leniently applied, due to the desire to appease employers who are willing to cooperate 
(ICIUKBA, 2010). Here, the prosecutorial discretion that typifies the application of 
crimmigration law is guided less by pragmatic considerations than by the political desire 
to criminalize migrants, not citizens. The vast majority of businesses subjected to 
administrative fines have names that indicate ethnic minority ownership (Home Office, 
2015c). A civil penalty for landlords who offer rented accommodation to irregular 
migrants under the UK Immigration Act 2014 was extended to criminal sanctions under 
the Immigration Act 2016. It seems likely that the effect will be felt most strongly by all 
migrants and ‘foreign-looking’ citizens. As Yeo (2015b) notes, even the Home Office can 
make mistakes about a person’s immigration status, so the effect on landlords will be a 
reluctance to rent to people who look foreign. 
 
4) Creative civil exclusions 
 
Creative civil exclusions were introduced by the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts to 
cement the ‘really hostile environment’ for migrants who are not entitled to be in the UK. 
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Such people cannot open banks accounts in UK and banks must check the immigration 
status of account holders, closing any accounts held by disqualified persons (Yeo, 2016). 
Driving licences can be revoked for those without leave to remain. A National Health 
Service annual surcharge of £200 is now levied on new migrants other than asylum 
seekers or those applying for humanitarian protection (Yeo, 2015a: 94). These measures 
require individuals to establish their immigration status in a variety of contexts: banks 
and building societies, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, and NHS bodies. As Yeo 
(2015b) notes, it is a ‘papers please’ approach, but without any actual papers that may 
easily be produced to prove one’s status. Meanwhile, marriages and civil partnerships 
involving non-citizens are subject to burdensome scrutiny. Under the Immigration Act 
2014, the Home Office may investigate a proposed marriage or civil partnership on 
‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that [it] is a sham’. The Home Office may then impose 
a 70-day period to ‘decide the compliance question’, without regard for the families 
involved and the plans they have made.  As a result of the Immigration Act 2016, many 
civil exclusions will carry criminal penalties, for instance a six-month prison sentence for 
those convicted of driving while unlawfully in the UK. Crimmigration law continues to be 
a site of legal creativity, expansion and exploitation. 
 
 
IV. Policing and crimmigration enforcement 
 
 
A specialist form of policing has emerged to enforce crimmigration law. Capitalizing on 
contemporary global policing trends, the UK crimmigration control system embraces a 
multi-nodal security network with different sites of governance (Weber and Bowling, 
2004; Weber, 2013: 9; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). Accessorial liability harnesses third 
parties—airline check-in officers, bank clerks, universities, landlords and employers—as 
private enforcers of border control and mobilizes the community in risk-based policies 
and practices of immigration enforcement (Weber, 2013: 11), and the ‘Immigration 
Enforcement Hotline’ encourages public engagement (Home Office, 2015b). Nor is 
crimmigration policing confined to the border. Offshore controls, such as pre-boarding 
checks at overseas ports and increasingly restrictive visa regimes, seek to stem flows at 
source, preventing many migrants from ever reaching the border, while internal controls 
reach deep into UK society to uncover those the UK wants to remove (Weber and Bowling, 
2004: 201). In this way, crimmigration policing displaces and delocalizes borders to 
respond more effectively to criminalized migrants in the global system.  
 
Ian MacDonald QC (2010) describes the UK Border Force as a true immigration police 
force. Established in 2008, it is responsible for immigration and customs controls at 138 
ports in the UK, France and Belgium, and it has a significant domestic policing capacity. 
As of 2013–14 the Border Force had a full-time staff of 7,600 and a budget of £604m. Its 
personnel consist of ‘flexible, multi-skilled officers’ for an ‘integrated, rapid response’. 
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The officers have a wide range of hybrid immigration-criminal powers and police-like 
uniforms, insignia and vehicles. Their fulfilment of their public protection mandate 
(Rhodes, 2008), is assessed by the UK Home Office according to performance and 
efficiency criteria. The British government’s desire for selective control of the space of 
flows is reflected in its main objective of ‘preventing harmful individuals […] entering the 
UK, and facilitating the legitimate movement of individuals’.  
Most importantly, the Border Force has acquired powers that mark its independence and 
separation from domestic policing. Legislation since the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 has substantially extended its powers of arrest. One such power, administrative 
arrests (without a warrant) for the purpose of detention and removal of persons 
including illegal entrants, overstayers and persons in breach of conditions, or persons 
suspected of being in those categories, has brought foreign-looking individuals within the 
ambit of crimmigration police powers. Border Force officers also have powers that were 
hitherto the preserve of domestic police constables, such as search, entry, seizure, and 
the use of reasonable force. In parallel to the offence of obstructing or assaulting a police 
officer, it is also a criminal offence to obstruct immigration officers in carrying out their 
functions. With the Immigration Act 2016, these police-like powers continue to be 
extended, yet ‘with none of the expertise, experience…or complaints procedures that 
protect the public from police powers’ (Yeo, 2015b; 2016).  
 
There are legitimate concerns about this development. In a 2014 inspection report on the 
use of warrants to enter business premises, former chief constable John Vine, as 
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, disagreed with decisions made 
by an Assistant Director to authorize the use of this power in almost two-thirds of the 
cases examined (Vine, 2014b). Nevertheless, UK Border Force officials exercise their 
power at home and abroad, demonstrating the transnational nature of this policing 
system. Juxtaposed controls, first established in the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, permit 
Britain and France, and Britain and Belgium, to operate full immigration controls on each 
other’s territory. Immigration officials operating within these ‘control zones’ may refuse 
a person leave to enter, cancel prior entry clearance, and enforce immigration offences, 
including by arrest, detention and the bringing of persons to their own territory 
(Reynolds and Muggeridge, 2008). Avenues for legal challenges are limited, and asylum 
claims cannot be made. Similarly, many countries host UK immigration officials in an 
advisory capacity, creating a UK immigration network covering at least 126 countries. UK 
immigration officers’ advice helps to frustrate irregular migration but also hinders 
refugees seeking a safe country even when in possession of valid travel documentation 
(Reynolds and Muggeridge, 2008). The UK government recently announced a British law 
enforcement taskforce to tackle organized immigration crime in the Mediterranean 
region (Travis, 2015). According to a Number 10 spokesman, ‘around 90 officers will be 
deployed in the UK, the Mediterranean and Africa to pursue and disrupt these organised 
crime groups profiting from the people-smuggling trade.’ Based with Europol in Sicily 
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and The Hague, and working with the Border Force, GCHQ and MI6, it is far from an 
administrative enterprise; this is a powerful crimmigration taskforce. 
 
 
V. Intelligence and surveillance 
 
 
While fortifying conventional borders plays a key role in the crimmigration control 
system, providing citizens with a comforting simulacrum of security, the system’s 
instrumental value is enhanced by its intelligence and surveillance capacities (Sheptycki, 
2002). In parallel with contemporary developments in the criminal justice system, the 
pursuit of pre-emptive, actuarial crimmigration control demands the latest intelligence 
technologies. States also recognize the need to control global networks as well as 
physical, territorial space, further driving the demand for ‘smart borders’. The 
crimmigration control system has accordingly developed a sophisticated transnational 
system of surveillance, acquiring intelligence from public and private data sources across 
borders and institutions (Bigo, 2002). 
 
The UK e-Borders scheme, created in 2003 and now merged into the Border System 
Programme, is ‘a risk-based system that deploys processes of data mining and analytics 
in order to derive a risk score or flag for individuals entering or exiting the UK’ (Amoore, 
2011: 25). Raw data is collected from Passenger Name Records (PNR) and Advanced 
Passenger Information (API) submitted by carriers; from visa applications and voluntary 
‘trusted-traveller’ schemes; and from criminal and terrorist watch-lists, in which 
immigration offenders are now included (Broeders and Hampshire, 2013: 1207–8). The 
categories and codes emanating from these databases are then subjected to social sorting, 
classifying passengers for differential treatment (Weber and Bowling, 2008: 363; 
Dijstelbloem and Broeders, 2015: 26). Intelligence systems and processes of this kind are  
the appendages necessary for embed global policing practices in the local domestic 
jurisdiction (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). 
 
Broeders and Hampshire (2013) identified three distinct classification categories: black, 
grey and green. Black has the harshest outcome: exclusion, refusal of entry and detention. 
Suspected terrorists, criminals, visa overstayers, those who have previously worked 
illegally and ‘failed asylum seekers’ find themselves included on criminal and terrorist 
watch lists and blacklisted. This intervention is largely automated, and it is very difficult 
to challenge or correct information held in these databases (2013: 1210). Due to pre-
embarkation checks, private carriers are central to the practice of blacklisting; with heavy 
carrier sanctions, the explanations of travellers flagged in a watch-list check prior to 
departure will fall on deaf ears. Yet with the growing volume of data, combined with an 
increased use of watch-lists, errors are bound to occur. It seems the individuals affected 




At the other end of the spectrum, green-listing facilitates inclusion. Green-listed travellers 
are registered, low-risk, third-country nationals—the desirable tourists and business 
people—who can pass unsupervised through e-Borders after an initial check and 
screening at time of registration. They are at home in the space of flows. Despite being 
outsiders in terms of membership of the nation-state, these travellers are perceived to 
add value to the network and are politically and culturally—or, more bluntly, racially—
acceptable members of an emerging transnational space (Aas, 2007: 295). Expedited 
entry for this emerging global elite serves economic imperatives, reducing queues while 
freeing up resources to exercise tighter controls on riskier flows (Weber and Bowling, 
2008: 369; Broeders and Hampshire, 2013: 1211; Bowling, Phillips and Sheptycki, 2012).  
 
Grey-listing involves risk profiling of passenger data drawn principally from API and PNR 
data. Differential treatment thus relies on computer-automated analysis against rule-
based profiles. Nationality is of course one key factor in sifting out unwanted travellers. 
Subsequent manual assessment will occur before the National Border Targeting Centre 
issues an alert to the Border Force, but the small amount of human agency that remains 
in the decision-making is ‘increasingly located with those who design the algorithms and 
check the matches that risk-profiling generates’ and is thus distanced from the site of 
execution (Broeders and Hampshire, 2013: 1213). This progressive removal of face-to-
face interaction with the passenger risks even more systemic racial and ethnic 
discrimination (Bowling and Westenra, 2018).  Surveillance is the most successful aspect 
of the UK crimmigration control system for preventing the movement of undesirables, 
funnelling bodies through the transnational space of flows in a gradated demarcation of 
membership—with pernicious consequences for many and the promise of unfettered 
global mobility for the few. 
 
 
VI. Crimmigration legal process: courts, tribunals and appeals 
 
 
The crimmigration control system includes a well-established tribunal system, albeit one 
that serves Home Office ambitions more than a judicial system should. Although criminal 
cases are dealt with in the criminal courts, appeals on administrative decisions, including 
such measures as detention and deportation, operate within a two-tier independent 
tribunal with an immigration and asylum chamber, pursuant to the Tribunals Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007. Despite the principle of equality before the law, and the formal 
appearance of consistent treatment between immigration crimes and other crimes, Aas 
(2014) shows how immigrants facing charges in the criminal courts are afforded an 
abnormally low standard of justice. Immigration status—the marker for lack of 
membership—is a ‘pervasively important factor in almost every aspect of a criminal 
proceeding’ (Aliverti, 2013: 107). Immigrants are typically refused bail and are thus at 
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greater risk of conviction due to the inherent difficulties involved in fighting cases from 
prison (Aliverti, 2013: 101). Hearings are characterized by a lack of participation from 
the accused, with questions generally directed to the lawyer rather than the defendant 
(Aliverti 2013: 101). The overwhelming majority of immigration-offence cases are settled 
through guilty pleas (Aliverti 2013: 99), while the sanction for an immigration offence is 
almost always imprisonment; courts systematically rule out non-custodial sentences for 
undocumented immigration convicts and those who have weak ties to the country 
(Aliverti 2013: 114). To make decision-making less complex, magistrates and judges also 
distinguish the immigration case from the criminal case, expeditiously administering 
punishment through the repetition of similar formulas. The chances of mercy are slim. 
 
This bureaucratic exercise of the judicial function also characterizes the tribunal system 
(Aliverti, 2013: 115). Demands for efficiency drive the system ever closer to a managerial 
process for disposing of appeals. Indeed, its entire organization is geared towards 
achieving performance targets. The clearest manifestation of this was the Detained Fast 
Track appeal system under the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 SI 2014 No. 2604. This required individuals to prepare 
and present their appeals within seven days of the decisions they sought to challenge, 
despite being detained for administrative convenience. This was recently found to be 
ultra vires, which the Court of Appeal case The Lord Chancellor v Detention Action [2015] 
EWCA Civ 840 confirmed. As Lord Dyson at [49] stated, ‘justice and fairness should not 
be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency’. But the tide of efficiency is hard to stem. 
One of the changes made by the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 is to allow a hearing to proceed in a party’s absence if 
the tribunal is satisfied reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing 
and it is in the interests of justice to continue (Rule 28). This greatly expands the old Rule 
19 and gives little guidance on what interests of justice might merit the continuation of 
an appeal when there is no indication of what has happened to the missing party. 
 
The remit of the Tribunal is tightly confined. The Immigration Act 2014 drastically 
reduced appeal rights for immigrants, installing a system that only permits an appeal if a 
claim is made, followed by a decision by the Secretary of State regarding international 
protection or human rights or if protection status is revoked. Permissible grounds of 
appeal were also pared back. The ground of ‘otherwise not in accordance with law’, which 
had brought about the development of a public law jurisdiction in the Tribunal, has been 
removed, as has the race discrimination ground of appeal pursuant to the Race Relations 
Act 1976. Whether human rights grounds may preserve such arguments remains to be 
seen (Yeo, 2015a: 47). A sharp reduction in the number of appeals is anticipated. The 
success rate for appeals is around 40% overall. Many people who would once have won 




At the same time, the system of Administrative Review under the Immigration Rules has 
been expanded. Under this review mechanism, the Home Office can review its own 
decisions, albeit these reviews are carried out by caseworkers who took no part in 
making the original decisions. Only ‘case working errors’ may be reviewed, as set out 
exhaustively in Appendix AR. The scope of a case working error appears reasonably 
broad, but as Yeo notes, ‘it is hard to believe that one civil servant at the Home Office will 
seriously consider overturning the decision of another where the refusal was a matter of 
judgment rather than a simple mistake or error’ (Yeo, 2015a: 53).  
 
Taking curtailment of appeals to another level, the government has endeavoured to exert 
carte blanche control over foreign criminals at the expense of justice. The Immigration 
Act 2014 introduced the ‘deport first, appeal later’ rule, under s94B of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This gave the Home Office the power to certify human 
rights claims made by those liable to deportation, the effect of which was to require 
appellants to bring their appeals from outside the UK. Although, pursuant to subsections 
(2) and (3), the overarching criterion for certification was that removal pending appeal 
would not breach the claimant’s human rights, Home Office guidance, misleadingly or 
simply through ‘lack of clarity’, reduced this to a concession for appellants who could 
prove that removal would result in ‘serious irreversible harm’. 
 
The drive towards out-of-country appeals continued apace with the introduction of an 
amendment to s94B under the Immigration Act 2016. With effect from 1 December 2016, 
the Home Secretary’s power to certify under the section was extended to any human 
rights claim irrespective of whether the claimant was liable to deportation; in other 
words, irrespective of whether they were a ‘foreign criminal’. Given that the only grounds 
on which normal immigration decisions can now be appealed are human rights grounds, 
this change targeted a wide spectrum of ordinary migrants (Yeo, 2016). The initial appeal 
to the public interest in preventing, in the Prime Minister’s words, ‘suspected terrorists 
playing the system’ (D’Ancona, 2013) was revealed as a mere stepping stone in the 
erosion of human rights. The logistical and financial barriers to conducting an appeal 
from outside the UK are obvious; while a video-link-enabled court may be offered to 
appellants who wish to participate in their appeal, all costs, including security and ‘tech 
support’, have to be covered by the appellant (Light, 2015). As Sedley LJ stated in BA 
(Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 119, ‘The 
reason why the Home Office is insistent on removal pending appeal…is that in the great 
majority of cases it is the end of the appeal’.  
 
In a damning indictment of the Home Office, the UK Supreme Court struck down ‘deport 
first, appeal later’ certificates for two foreign criminals in R (Kiarie and Byndloss) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 42, overturning the Court of 
Appeal’s endorsement of the practice. The barriers to giving evidence on screen were 
found to be almost insurmountable, and thus in breach of the procedural requirements 
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of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act. Lord Wilson strongly criticised the Home Secretary 
for ‘routinely exercis[ing] her power under section 94B to certify claims of foreign 
criminals under article 8 […] in the absence of a Convention-compliant system for the 
conduct of an appeal from abroad’. The repercussions of the decision for the lawful 
exercise of the newly amended s94B was acknowledged by the Court, bringing at least a 
temporary end to the certification of immigration appeals.  
 
It is worthwhile pausing to examine the use of s94B before it came under the scrutiny of 
the Supreme Court. Of the 1,175 foreign criminals deported in advance of their appeals 
between July 2014 and December 2016, only 72 filed notice of appeal from abroad. None 
of the appeals succeeded. While the Supreme Court’s judgment represents a powerful 
check on executive power, it is safe to assume that the Home Office will continue to find 
workarounds. We can only hope that legal teams representing appellants in immigration 
appeals can build on Kiarie to defend and strengthen migrants’ appeal rights in the face 
of what will be continuing opposition. 
 
 
VII.  ‘Immcarceration’: detention and imprisonment 
 
 
The crimmigration control system parallels the criminal justice system in that it controls 
a ‘secure estate’ of prison-like detention centres; except of course that the crimmigration 
control system’s secure facilities are geared towards the incapacitation and removal of 
undesirables. The UK currently has eight Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs). There are 
around 3,000 bed spaces in a system that has an annual turnover of 30,000 (Bosworth, 
2016: 147).  
 
Immigration detention has conventionally been categorized as a bureaucratic function 
regulated by administrative law. However, the inclusion of asylum seekers, pursuant to 
the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, instigated the renaming of detention centres as 
Immigration Removal Centres in 2001 to signify their purpose more clearly. IRCs are 
meant to assist the removal process of people without a legal right to be in the country. 
Non-citizens may be detained to facilitate an identity check, test the basis of their claims, 
or prevent absconding (Bosworth and Turnbull, 2014). Yet IRCs finesse the fact that they 
are places of detention to prevent closer scrutiny. Accepting that immigration 
imprisonment constitutes a punishment measure would require greater normative 
justification, but renaming allows the crimmigration secure estate to decouple itself from 
the domestic prison system and promote an image of legitimacy. Despite this rebranding, 
IRCs and STHFs look like prisons, operate like prisons, and are experienced by detainees 
as prisons. ‘The locked doors, roll counts, room searches, pat-downs, bars on windows, 
high fences topped with razor wire, and ubiquitous CCTV cameras are constant 
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reminders to detainees of the denial of their liberty’ (Bosworth and Turnbull, 2014). The 
legal definition of the crimmigration secure estate as administrative rather than punitive 
is at best disingenuous; at worst, it is exploitative. 
 
While domestic imprisonment retains its historical links with the emergence of liberal 
democratic government, immigration detention or ‘immcarceration’ operates without 
such limits. Thus there is no automatic judicial oversight of the decision to detain and no 
statutory limit on the length of time a person can be held (Bosworth, 2013: 150). The only 
positive development is the new obligation on the Secretary of State, under the 
Immigration Act 2016, to arrange a referral to the tribunal within four months of the 
commencement of immigration detention for the purpose of considering whether to 
grant bail; the obligation does not, however, extend to a requirement on the tribunal to 
conduct a hearing within a certain time nor indeed to conduct a hearing at all (Yeo, 2016: 
69). These features of immigration detention intensify the punitive experience. They also 
provide the Home Office with practical reasons to maintain the distinction.  
 
The crimmigration secure estate is beset by contradictions in its justifications and 
purpose. It borrows legitimacy from the criminal justice system while eschewing its 
normative underpinnings. In consequence, IRC staff and detainees alike struggle to 
understand the nature of this custodial institution (Bosworth, 2016). For IRC staff, this 
struggle leads to some uncertainty over the ethical and legal grounding of their work. 
Reservations surface when confronted with particularly sympathetic cases. In interviews, 
IRC staff expressed a high degree of compassion with detainees, finding their personal 
situation and stories heartbreaking (Bosworth 2015: 220–221).  As one Detainee Custody 
Officer noted, however, ‘It just like erases your senses… I think it just sickens you up, this 
job' (Bosworth, 2016). Bosworth (2016) adds, ‘No officer interviewed ever reported 
refusing to follow orders. … Moral concerns can, indeed, be silenced by task-focused 
bureaucracy and by an authoritarian and complex power structure.’   
 
In managing these complex institutions, the Home Office governs at a distance through 
private companies contracted to carry out the day-to-day responsibilities of IRCs, and 
bifurcates internal and off-site immigration agents. Decisions about immigration matters 
are made off-site by ‘case owners’, while onsite immigration agents who come face-to-
face with detainees play no role in decision-making and are mere conduits of information 
(Bosworth, 2013: 159). Through creating such distance between a decision and its 
consequences, the government effectively places its own decisions beyond the reach of 
moral impulse; it also prevents the detainee from confronting the actor face-to-face 
(Bauman, 1989: 215). We return to the role of bureaucratization and social distancing in 




The Home Office routinely ignores the impact of its decisions on detainees. Detainees may 
be moved to different centres around the country without warning simply for 
administrative convenience. Not only is such enforced internal mobility distressing for 
the detainee; it causes problems with access to legal representation and exacerbates the 
issue of short timescales for appeals. The erosion of proximity between detainees and 
decision-makers does not always serve efficiency, but the greater concern is that morality 
is effectively disabled. The people working in this archipelago of pain are aware of their 
disempowerment. They do not perceive it as their job to understand immigration politics, 
policy or morality; they carry out orders even when they are ‘potentially forcing 
somebody into a situation where they’re going to be taken back and tortured, killed, 
whatever’ (Bosworth, 2016: 160). Ultimately, most rationalize their actions by laying the 
blame elsewhere. The crimmigration control system itself remains free from challenge. 
 
 
VIII. Discussion: crimmigration, adiaphorization and 
globalization 
 
A bespoke system for controlling, policing, judging, punishing, detaining and banishing 
criminalized migrants first emerged in the early 1970s, but it is only in the twenty-first 
century that this system has achieved its fullest expression in law and practice. The UK 
crimmigration control system parallels the institutional structure of the criminal justice 
system, from surveillance and policing to courtroom trial, punishment and 
imprisonment. Like it too, this institutional assemblage is used for the purpose of social, 
moral and spatial exclusion. Questions about ‘who belongs and what kinds of rights they 
deserve’ are embedded in the system’s imposition of criminal sanctions and in its 
decisions to expel and deny entry (Aas, 2013: 23); these questions are suspended 
indefinitely, left to hand, like the sword of Damocles, over its subjects. The precariousness 
of membership becomes a key feature of the space of flows in the globally networked 
society. Even lawful permanent residence remains a kind of probationary membership of 
the nation-state (Stumpf, 2006: 401). The emerging system delimits profound differences 
between citizens and non-citizens, reifying the contingency of belonging and associated 
rights. The consequences of this are much wider than advertised. 
 
A specialized appendage has grown out of the domestic criminal justice system in the UK 
to deal specifically with immigrants suspected of criminal offending, including a raft of 
newly created immigration crimes. This evolving system is, in some respects, embedded 
within existing police, judicial and prison systems. However, in other respects, the 
crimmigration control system is becoming independent of the conventional justice 
system. The power to control, coerce, punish and imprison certain categories of suspect 
population is devolving from the criminal justice systemto a new tailor-made 
arrangement that is authorized by hybrid crimmigration law. Having fused criminal law 
with administrative immigration law, it combines, within new agencies and institutions 
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(e.g. Border Force and Immigration Removal Centres), the surveillant and coercive power 
of the police, the punitive powers of the courts and the carceral powers of the prison 
together with border control powers that can be exercised far from the physical border. 
In our view, this shift, observed by numerous others in this field within the UK and 
elsewhere, is worthy of further empirical study. We need to know more about its system-
like qualities and the linkages that are being forged within and between domestic and 
international agencies; the sharing of information, tactics and techniques; as well as the 
impact on the lives of the people who are suspected, arrested, detained and deported. 
 
While exploiting the penal aspects of the criminal justice system and its logic of exclusion, 
crimmigration discards the constraining norms of criminal justice, which, as Aas (2013: 
33) explains, ‘operates according to the basic premise and ambition of eventual inclusion’. 
The narrative of reform and rehabilitation to which this gives rise—and which humanizes 
the system, acknowledging its subjects’ individuality and humanity—is absent from 
crimmigration control, which pursues a sub-variety of exclusion: expulsion (Aas, 2013: 
25; Weber and Bowling, 2008; Bosworth, et al, 2017). And it is the crimmigration control 
system’s independence from the criminal justice system that is key to facilitating this 
goal, freeing it to pursue its secondary goal: efficiency. The government presents 
immigration control as ‘above all a question of good management’ (Home Office, 2002) 
whilst implementing its mission of creating a really hostile environment. Contradictions 
in Home Office rhetoric and justifications for crimmigration control raise troubling 
questions about the protection of human rights in a global system of policing, punishment 
and exclusion.  
 
Thinking in terms of Herbert Packer’s classic models of the criminal justice system, 
crimmigration control favours the ‘crime control’ or ‘efficiency’ model over the ‘due 
process’ or ‘freedom’ model. Requirements of legitimacy were deeply concerning to 
criminal justice scholars in Packer’s time, but the emergent crimmigration control system 
exhibits no such concern. Where the criminal justice system arguably seeks to secure 
both crime control and criminal justice through institutional due process arrangements 
and normative moral principles, crimmigration control seeks efficiency and effectiveness 
in terms of migrant population management. The imperative of efficient control supports 
the social and economic interests of a select few while immobilizing others on the 
grounds that they ‘are the waste of the world which has dedicated itself to tourist 
services’ (Bauman, 1998: 92; Weber and Bowling, 2008; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012).  
It is no surprise that there is no counterweight of moral concerns about social justice in 
crimmigration control. The failure of crimmigration law to satisfy basic principles of 
social justice undercuts any attempt to justify the crimmigration control system in 
relation to due process rules. This is clearly no crimmigration justice system. 
 
The instrumental logic of crimmigration control is supported by a process through which 
individuals and their humanity, pain and suffering are obscured from view. This obscurity 
is facilitated by what Bauman terms adiaphorization,  the disabling of morality through 
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strong emphasis on the pursuit of efficiency (Bauman, 1989: 184; Barker, 2010: 279). The 
concept originates from the word ‘adiaphoron,’ a thing decreed by the Church to be 
morally neutral and about which religion is indifferent. Adiaphoric action is thus 
understood to be neither good nor evil, but measurable against technical, purpose-
oriented or procedural norms and decidedly not by moral values (Bauman, 1989: 215). 
By refusing to regard immigrants as moral subjects, only as units and collectivities to be 
managed, the concern with institutional moral behaviour is neutralized in favour of 
instrumental and procedural rationalities (Bauman, 1989: 215). Adiaphorization 
permeates all aspects of crimmigration control, removing the disruptive influence of 
morality and diminishing the moral status of migrants, transforming them into criminal 
threats: undesirables, who must be controlled, evacuated and excluded. Notwithstanding 
any claims to efficiency and effectiveness attributed to the evolving transnational system 
of policing and punishment, concerns about social justice or ensuring safety and 
wellbeing of migrants are not the focus. The result of the growth of technological and 
bureaucratic techniques and rationalities is that we lose sensitivity to, and responsibility 
for, each other (Barker, 2015). This process of distancing enables what Bauman (1989) 
refers to as the ‘social production of immorality’ (see also Erickson, 2015). The challenge 
is to recover a sense of the moral duty of care (Barker, 2015: 279) 
 
The emerging crimmigration control system provides a vital link between domestic and 
global systems of policing, punishment and control. Looking inward into domestic space, 
a tailor-made system authorized by hybrid criminal-administrative law serves to link 
agencies concerned with the management of criminalized migrants. This has the effect of 
widening the net of social control with thinner mesh and thicker strands of surveillance 
and punishment. Looking outward, the criminal immigrant is a universally recognized 
‘folk devil’, the ‘usual suspect’ par excellence in the pursuit of global collaboration in law 
enforcement and crime control. This tendency is best documented in the policing field, 
where an extensive network of overseas liaison officers is focused on the surveillance of 
suspect populations (Bowling, 2010b; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012). The police officers 
who are the interface between domestic and overseas agencies tend to be geographically 
mobile and transnational in outlook. They often have close links with their counterparts 
in other countries through overseas placements, networks, conferences and training 
courses. Similar processes are evident in other fields, such as international networks of 
immigration officers and the wide range of public and private agencies involved the 
processes of deportation, administrative removal and prisoner transfer (Bosworth et al., 
2017: 37–40).  
 
A key feature of the criminalized migrant is that these people are supposed to be from 
elsewhere. The operating environment is framed by the sense that these people do not 
belong, should be met with a hostile environment and must constantly be threatened with 
the possibility of removal to another jurisdiction. The intention of the state is ‘directed 
outwards, beyond state territory, rather than inwards, back into the social’ (Bosworth et 
al., 2017: 43). The infrastructure required to achieve the purposes of banishment and 
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territorial exclusion includes information-sharing linkages across police, courts and 
detention centres with databases shared domestically and internationally. This 
infrastructure—assembled from police, immigration, customs, airport security, and 
secret intelligence with access to physical spaces including airport holding cells and 
immigration removal centres—enables personnel to connect globally to exert control 
within the transnational space of flows. The pursuit of the criminalized immigrant is 






This article has set out the evolving system of crimmigration control, using the UK as a 
case study to illustrate what we think is a broad trend in the development of global social 
control.2 As we have shown, the state’s effort to control criminalized immigrants has led 
to the emergence of a custom-made system of crimmigration control, built at the 
confluence of criminal law and administrative immigration law with its own specialized 
institutions and processes. At the same time, the emphasis on the efficient control of the 
criminalized migrant has disabled the discussion of justice and morality in this context. 
This process of adiaphorization is so powerful that the UK government can speak of 
creating a ‘really hostile environment’ for illegal immigrants simply as an aspect of the 
good management of migration. Finally, the crimmigration control system can be 
understood as a particular domestic instantiation of global mobility control and as a key 
mechanism that links domestic and global systems of policing, punishment and exclusion. 
These developments raise urgent new questions about the nature of law, policing, 
punishment, justice and control under transnational conditions. This is fertile ground for 
further research and activism among those concerned with the pursuit of global justice. 
 
  
                                                           
2 This contention is supported by indications pointing broadly in the same direction in the USA (e.g. Miller, 
2010; Stumpf, 2013), Canada (Pratt, 2005), Australia (e.g. Pickering and Weber, 2013; Weber, 2013) and 
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